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I. Introduction
Wireless technology was introduced in the 1980s and has rapidly evolved in
the last thirty years.' Since wireless applications use free space as the medium to
transmit information, the application of wireless technology is far-reaching. 2 It can
involve "voice, data, video and multimedia applications and services. 3 For exam-
ple, wireless technology can be used in microwave TV transmissions, cellular tele-
phone services, HDTV, Digital Audio Broadcasting (DAB), and a host of other
technologies.4
In the near future, wireless technologies will facilitate even greater social
network participation between people and devices.5  Users will be able to wire-
lessly build their own computer system on the fly and seamlessly share data from
one device to another.6 For instance, you will be able to wirelessly edit videos
stored in your camcorder using your laptop and then show the videos on a friend's
TV. 7 One developing technology that will make this possible is Dynamic Compos-
able Computing (DCC). 8 DCC allows Mobile Internet Devices (MIDs) to connect
wirelessly to nearby monitors, speakers, keyboards and other components. 9 This
See Dazheng Wang, Patent Pool: A Solution to the Problem of TD-SCDMA 's Commercialization,
2008 INT'L SEMINAR ON FUTURE BIOMED. INFO. ENG'G 304, 304 (discussing the evolution of
wireless telephone technology).
2 See Liliana Diaz Olavarrieta & Alfredo Aparicio Nava, Wireless Communications: A Bird's Eye
View of an Emerging Technology, 2004 INT'L SYMPOSIUM ON COMMS. & INFO. TECHS. 541, 541.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id. (noting a set of user-centered services that are desired for the future).
6 See Anna Bogdanowicz, Dynamic Sharing, 33 THE INSTITUTE 9 (2009), available at
http://www.ieee.org/portal/cms-docstionline/tionline/tisep09.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
7 Id.
8 See id. (stating that DCC will work like Bluetooth technology, which queries devices in nearby
areas to connect to).
9 Id.
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wireless connection compensates for the drawbacks of mobile devices such as small
screens, small keyboards, or poor speakers by allowing a mobile device access to
better hardware.'O
DCC could be commercially available in five years," and its development re-
lies on advances in several areas with significant patent activity.' 2 For example,
new consumer electronics that exploit DCC will be created.' 3  The component
needed to implement DCC will either be built into every device or made available
as a software download. 14 Improvement in processor technology will allow greater
interoperability between MIDs, desktops, and other devices. 15 At the same time,
advanced wireless communication standards will wirelessly connect major system
components of a computer architecture. 16 Finally, technologists will have to de-
velop new security or implement existing technology to prevent unauthorized ac-
cess to data in these complex systems. " A theme that is consistent across all these
technologies is that these advances facilitate interaction between multiple compo-
nents and multiple parties.
Recent developments in patent law will affect how patents directed to wire-
less technologies such as DCC are written and enforced. 18 For example, to succeed
in an action for infringement, a patent holder must present evidence that a single
10 Id.
I11ld. (noting that Intel, which already has a prototype, indicated that DCC could be commercially
available in approximately five years).
12 See Wang, supra note 1, at 304 ( "Patents are becoming so important that almost all companies
want to obtain their competitive advantages by implementing their patent strategies in the wireless
telecoms industry.").
13 See Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9.
14 See Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9.
15 See Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9.
16 See Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9.
17 Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9 (emphasizing the approaches that Intel's developers may take in
ensuring that connections into the component devices is secure such as password-enabled access
and near-field communications).
See Joshua P. Larsen, Liability for Divided Performance of Process Claims After BMC Resources,
Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 19 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 41, 43 (2008) (noting that
the Federal Circuit's recent interpretation of Section 271 may restrict liability for direct infringe-
ment "to situations where one 'mastermind' entity exercises 'control or direction' over the in-
fringement").
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infringer manufactured, used, or performed all the elements in a claim. " What
happens when a patentee presents a court with asserted method claims that require
performance by multiple parties? 20 One theory that the patentee may assert is that
the claims are infringed under a theory of joint infringement.21
Two cases decided by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ar-
ticulate the standards for joint infringement. In BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymen-
tech, L.P., the court ruled that to find liability in situations where steps of a method
claim are performed by multiple parties, the entire method must be performed at the
control or direction of the alleged direct infringer-the mastermind. 22 Approxi-
mately one year later, in Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit
clarified that "the control or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the
law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the
acts committed by another party that are required to complete performance of a
claimed method.,
23
District courts have attempted to apply the holdings of BMC Resources and
Muniauction in the two years following the Federal Circuit's decisions. In deciding
their cases, district courts have focused on how the asserted claims are drafted and
the relationships between the accused infringer and third parties. 24 Absent signifi-
cant evidence of how an accused infringer controlled third parties, patent holders
have found it difficult to support claims of infringement under a joint infringement
theory.25 Further, courts have suggested that carefully drafted claims directed to a
19 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("Infringement
requires, as it always has, a showing that a defendant has practiced each and every element of the
claimed invention." (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40
(2007))).
20 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2008) ("In BMC Resources,
decided in 2007, and Muniauction, decided in 2008, the Federal Circuit put to rest the suggestion
in some prior cases that multiple parties acting independently to perform all the claimed steps of a
method patent could directly infringe that patent.").
21 Courts sometimes refer to joint infringement as "divided infringement." See BMC Res., 498 F.3d
at 1380.
22 See BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380-81 (explaining that "it would be unfair indeed for the master-
mind in such situations to escape liability").
23 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC Res., 498
F.3d at 1379), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
24 See discussion infra Parts III, IV.
25 See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
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single actor would eliminate the need for patent holders to rely solely on joint in-
fringement theory.26
Section II of this article discusses the Federal Circuit's view of joint in-
fringement theory as articulated in its two most recent opinions. Section III ana-
lyzes how district courts have applied the Federal Circuit's holdings in BMC Re-
sources and Muniauction. In addition, it highlights evidence that may be favorable
to a successful assertion of infringement under a theory of joint infringement. Fi-
nally, Section IV examines how claims can be drafted to avoid reliance on joint in-
fringement theory during litigation.
II. Background
A. BMC Resources: Clarification of the Joint Infringement Standard
In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit determined the proper standard for
joint infringement liability by multiple parties of a single claim.27 Specifically, the
court "clarified the proper standard for whether a method claim is directly infringed
by the combined actions of multiple parties.' 28
The plaintiff, BMC Resources, Inc. (BMC), was the assignee of U.S. Patent
Nos. 5,715,298 (the '298 patent) and 5,870,456 (the '456 patent).29 Collectively,
BMC's patents disclosed a method requiring the combined action of several par-
ticipants. 30 The Federal Circuit summarized BMC's system as follows:
These patents claim a method for processing debit transactions without a per-
sonal identification number (PIN). The patented invention provides an interface
between a standard touch-tone telephone and a debit card network. On this inter-
face, a customer may perform real-time bill payment transactions with only a
telephone keypad. The invention includes an interactive voice response unit
(IVR) that prompts the caller to enter an access code, account number, debit card
number, and payment amount. This information, in turn, passes to a debit net-
26 See discussion infra Part IV.B.
27 BMCRes., 498 F.3d at 1378.
28 Id. at 1378-80; Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380).
29 BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1375; U.S. Patent No. 5,870,456 (filed Oct. 7, 1997); U.S. Patent No.
5,715,298 (filed Jan. 22, 1997).
30 See BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1375 (stating that BMC's patents featured the combined actions of
several participants including the payee's agent, a remote payment network, and the financial in-
stitution that issued the card).
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work and on to a banking or financial institution. Each of these entities partici-
pates in approving and carrying out the transaction. 
3 1
The defendant, Paymentech L.P. (Paymentech), provided financial transaction
processing. 32  Paymentech received payment information from its clients-
merchants who collected the payment information from its customers. 33 Paymen-
tech routed the information to a participating debit network that then forwarded the
information to an affiliated financial institution.34 The financial institution was
tasked with authorizing or declining the transaction and sending status information
back to Paymentech via the debit network.35
BMC demanded that Paymentech obtain a license to use its patented technol-
ogy upon learning that BMC planned to provide its financial processing services to
BMC's clients.36 In response, Paymentech refused and subsequently filed suit in
federal district court seeking a declaration of non-infringement of the BMC pat-
ents.37 BMC counterclaimed and alleged that Paymentech directly infringed claim
7 of the '456 patent and claim 2 of the '298 patent.38 Both parties filed summary
judgment motions relating to the infringement. 39
Both of the claims asserted by BMC are method claims.4 ° Claim 7 of the
'456 patent depends on claim 6.41 Claims 6 and 7 are reproduced below:
6. A method of paying bills using a telecommunications network line connect-
able to at least one remote payment card network via a payee's agent's system
wherein a caller begins session using a telecommunications network line to initi-
31 Id.
32 Id. at 1375-76 (describing Paymentech's sequence in processing PIN-less debit bill payment
transactions).
33 Id. at 1375.
34 Id. at 1376.
35 id.




4 Id. at 1376-77.
41 Id. at 1377.
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ate a spontaneous payment transaction to payee, the method comprising the steps
of:
prompting the caller to enter a payment number from one or more choices of
credit or debit forms of payment;
prompting the caller to enter a payment amount for the payment transaction;
accessing a remote payment network associated with the entered payment num-
ber, the accessed remote payment network determining, during the session,
whether sufficient available credit or funds exist in an account associated with
the payment number to complete the payment transaction, and upon a determina-
tion that sufficient available credit or funds exist in the associated account, charg-
ing the entered payment amount against the account with the entered payment
number, adding the entered payment amount to an account associated with the
entered account number, and storing the account number, payment number and
payment amount in a transaction file of the system.
7. The method of claim 6 wherein said payment is a PIN-less credit or debit card
number. 42
Claim 2 of the '298 patent depends on claim 1.43 Both claims 1 and 2 are repro-
duced below:
1. A method of paying bills using a telephone connectable to at least one remote
payment card network via a payee's agent's system, wherein a caller places a call
using said telephone to initiate a spontaneous payment transaction that does not
require pre-registration, to a payee, the method comprising the steps of:
prompting the caller to enter an account number using the telephone, the account
number identifying an account of a payor with the payee in connection with the
payment transaction;
responsive to entry of an account number, determining whether the entered ac-
count number is valid;
prompting the caller to enter a payment number using the telephone, the payment
number being selected at the discretion of the caller from any one of a number of
credit or debit forms of payment;
responsive to entry of the payment, determining whether the entered payment
number is valid;
prompting the caller to enter a payment amount for the payment transaction using
the telephone;
42 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 2007); U.S. Patent No.
5,870,456 (filed Oct. 7, 1997).
41 BMC Res.. 498 F.3d at 1377.
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responsive to a determination that a payment amount has been entered and fur-
ther responsive to a determination that the entered account number and payment
number are valid, and during the call;
accessing a remote payment network associated with the entered payment num-
ber, the accessed remote payment network determining, during the call, the ac-
count associated with the entered payment number to complete the payment
transaction; accessing a remote payment network associated with the entered
payment number, the accessed remote payment network determining, during the
call, whether sufficient available credit or funds exist in an account associated
with the entered payment number to complete the payment transaction;
responsive to a determination that sufficient available credit or funds exist in the
associated account, charging the entered payment amount against the account as-
sociated with the entered payment number, adding the entered payment amount
to an account associated with the entered account number, informing the caller
that the payment transaction has been authorized, and storing the account num-
ber, payment number and payment amount in a transaction log file of the system
during the call; and
responsive to determination that sufficient available credit or funds do not exist
in the associated account, informing the caller during the call that the current
payment transaction has been declined and terminating the current payment
transaction.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein said payment number is a debit card number.
44
Paymentech asserted that it did not infringe the claims because "it did not per-
form all of the steps of the patented method by itself or in coordination with its cus-
tomers and financial institutions. 45 In response, BMC argued that the Federal Cir-
cuit's decision in On Demand Machine Corp. v. Ingram Industries, Inc. modified
the adequate standards controlling joint infringement by multiple parties.46 Spe-
cifically, BMC argued that under On Demand, a plaintiff must meet a "participation
and combined action" standard to establish the connection required to prove joint
infringement. 47 BMC concluded that Paymentech infringed the asserted claims un-
der this standard.48
44 Id.; U.S. Patent No. 5,715,298 (filed Jan. 22, 1997).
" BMCRes., 498 F.3d at 1378.
46 Id. (citing On Demand Mach. Corp. v. Ingram Indus., Inc., 442 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
41 Id. at 1380.
48 Id. at 1378.
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The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas disagreed with
BMC that On Demand controlled, stating that BMC relied on language that was
dicta.49 After reviewing other district court decisions and finding no law on point
from the Federal Circuit, the district court concluded that Paymentech would in-
fringe the claims only "if the record showed that it directed or controlled the behav-
ior of the financial institutions that performed those claimed method steps that
Paymentech [itself] did not perform."5 ° In addition, the magistrate judge recom-
mended summary judgment after determining that Paymentech did not infringe, ei-
ther by itself or in connection with other entities, BMC's patents. 51 Accordingly,
having determined that the record did not contain any evidence of direction or con-
trol, the district court granted Paymentech's motion for summary judgment. 52
BMC appealed the district court's decision to the Federal Circuit. 53 The Fed-
eral Circuit also rejected BMC's argument that On Demand changed precedent re-
garding joint infringement. 54  In On Demand, the Federal Circuit stated that it
found no flaw with the district court's jury instructions as a statement of law. 55 The
jury instruction was as follows:
It is not necessary for the acts that constitute infringement to be performed by
one person or entity. When infringement results from the participation and com-
bined action(s) of more than one person or entity, they are all joint infringers and
jointly liable for patent infringement. Infringement of a patented process or
method cannot be avoided by having another perform one step of the process or
method. Where the infringement is the result of the participation and combined
action(s) of one or more persons or entities, they are joint infringers and are
jointly liable for the infringement. 56
Based on its interpretation of the jury instruction and the subsequent Federal
Circuit's conclusion that it had no flaw, BMC argued that the Federal Circuit
49 Id. (noting the district court's determination that On Demand did not alter the traditional standard
applied to infringement by multiple parties).
50 Id.
51 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
52 Id. at 1378.
" Id. at 1375.
14 See id. at 1380.
55 On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45; BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1380 (citation omitted).
56 On Demand, 442 F.3d at 1344-45; BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379 (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted).
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adopted a "'participation and combined action' standard as the type of 'connection'
a plaintiff must show to prove joint infringement., 57 However, the Federal Circuit
noted that its opinion in On Demand did not analyze the issues related to joint in-
fringement. 58 Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that On Demand did not change
Federal Circuit precedent regarding joint infringement and that BMC's interpreta-
tion went beyond settled law.
59
Having rebutted BMC's argument, the Federal Circuit began its analysis by
stating the traditional rule that to prevail under direct infringement, the plaintiff
must prove that a single party performed or used each element or step of the pat-
ented invention. 60 Thus, liability for infringement exists when a party "make[s],
use, sell, or offer to sell the entire patented invention., 61 The court pointed out that
indirect liability is the normal recourse under the law when a defendant, who is not
a direct infringer, encourages or is a participant in infringement.62 However, even
liability under indirect infringement requires an initial finding that at least one party
among all the accused actors has committed direct infringement.
63
The Federal Circuit also noted that other courts that dealt with joint infringe-
ment refused to find liability against a party that did not direct or control every step
of the patented process. 64 Further, the court addressed the appearance of a loophole
to escape liability if one party had a third party carry out one or more steps of a
claim. 65 The court explained that in such circumstances, "the law imposes vicarious
liability on a party for the acts of another in circumstances showing that the liable
17 See BMCRes., 498 F.3d at 1380.
58 See id. (emphasizing the district court's proper interpretation that just because the Federal Circuit
in On Demand found no flaw on the jury instruction, that doesn't indicate a wholesale adoption of
the instruction).
59 Id.
60 Id. at 1380 (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (2007)).
61 id.
62 Id. at 1379 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
63 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
64 Id. at 1380 (citations omitted).
65 Id. at 1379 (citation omitted).
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,,66party controlled the conduct of the acting party. Accordingly, a defendant in a
patent infringement claim could not escape liability merely by having another party
carry out a step or a series of steps on its behalf.67 In such instances, the party in
control would be held liable 68 "It would be unfair indeed for the mastermind in
such situations to escape liability," the court stated.69
Applying the control or direction standard to the facts, the court concluded
that Paymentech did not infringe BMC's patents. 70 BMC's evidence that Paymen-
tech provided data to debit networks, absent evidence that Paymentech also pro-
vided instructions or directions for the use of the data, was inadequate to create a
genuine issue of material fact whether Paymentech controlled or directed the activ-
ity of the debit networks.7' Moreover, the court found that evidence of direction or
control between Paymentech and the financial institutions are scarcer since the
lower court did not even find evidence of a contractual relationship. 72 Thus, with-
out sufficient evidence that Paymentech either directed or controlled both the finan-
cial institutions and the debit networks, the Federal Circuit concluded that "Pay-
mentech did not perform or cause to be performed each and every element of the
claims. 73
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that in some circumstances, parties may
avoid infringement under the control or direction standard by entering into arms-
length transactions.74 However, it warned that expanding the rules governing direct
infringement to cover the independent conduct of multiple actors would defeat the
66 Id at 1379 (citing Engle v. Dinehart, No. 99-10087, 2000 WL 554942 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2000)
(unpublished opinion)).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1381.
69 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
70 id.
71 Id. at 1381-82. BMC argued that "that instructions or directions can be inferred from the provi-
sion of these data, or that the data themselves provide instructions or directions." Id. However,
the court found that this inference is insufficient in the absence of evidence supporting either the-
ory. Id.
72 Id. at 1382 (pointing to the evidence in front of the district court and the magistrate judge).
73 Id.
74 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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statutory scheme underlying indirect infringement.7 5 It also added that these con-
cerns could be addressed by proper claim drafting.76
The Federal Circuit observed that BMC's claims had a defect by having four
different parties perform different acts within one claim. 7 Acknowledging BMC's
own difficulty with this claim format, the court nevertheless refused to "unilaterally
restructure the claim or the standards for joint infringement to remedy [BMC's] ill-
conceived claims. 78
B. Muniauction: The Multi-Party Spectrum Defined
Approximately one year later in Muniauction, the Federal Circuit was pre-
sented with another case in which a patentee, Muniauction, Inc., claimed that the
defendant, Thomson, infringed the patentee's patents under the joint infringement
theory. 79 The patent at issue in Muniauction, U.S. Patent No. 6,161,099, was di-
rected to conducting an auction of financial instruments over a network (e.g., the
internet) using a web browser.8 ° The system described in the patent allowed bid-
ders to submit bids using a conventional web browser. 81 The accused process,
owned by Thomson, allowed users to issue bids over the Internet using a web
browser. 82
7 Id. ("Direct infringement is a strict-liability offense, but it is limited to those who practice each
and every element of the claimed invention. By contrast, indirect liability requires evidence of
,specific intent' to induce infringement. Another form of indirect infringement, contributory in-
fringement under § 271(c), also requires a mens rea (knowledge) and is limited to sales of compo-
nents or materials without substantial noninfringing uses. Under BMC's proposed approach, a
patentee would rarely, if ever, need to bring a claim for indirect infringement.")
76 Id. (providing that a plaintiff can structure a claim by focusing on one entity. It added that BMC's
claim, could have referred to a single entity instead of having four different parties perform parts
of a claim).
77 Id.
78 Id. at 1381 (citing Sage Prods. Inc. v. Devon Indus. Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
79 See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
80 See id. at 1321-22.
Id. at 1322 ("[T]he '099 patent provides an 'integrated system on a single server' that allows issu-
ers to run the auction and bidders to prepare and submit bids using a conventional web browser,
without the use of other separate software.").
82 Id. at 1323.
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Thomson moved for a judgment as a matter of law after a jury found that it
willfully infringed the claims of the asserted patent.83 The district court denied the
motion, and Thomson appealed to the Federal Circuit.84 On appeal, Muniauction
continued to argue that Thomson infringed the claims based solely on a theory of
joint infringement.85 Since both parties agreed that no single party performed every
step of the asserted claims, the issue before the Federal Circuit was whether the ac-
tion of the bidder and auctioneer could be combined to give rise to a finding of di-
rect infringement by the auctioneer. 86
The Federal Circuit's decision in BMC Resources was rendered while Muni-
auction was on appeal.87 Summarizing BMC Resources, the Muniauction court de-
scribed a multiparty spectrum for direct infringement.88 At one end of the spec-
trum, "where the actions of multiple parties combine to perform every step of a
claimed method, the claim is directly infringed only if one party exercises 'control
or direction' over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the con-
trolling party, i.e., the 'mastermind.' ' 89 At the other end of the spectrum, the Fed-
eral Circuit stated, "mere 'arms-length cooperation' would not give rise to direct
infringement by any party." 90  Given this spectrum, the Muniauction court con-
cluded that one situation in which the control or direction standard would be satis-
fied is where the accused infringer is held vicariously liable for the acts of another
party. 
91
Thus, in applying the BMC Resources standard, the Federal Circuit examined
the facts to determine whether Thomson sufficiently controlled or directed other
83 Id. The jury imposed over $38 million in damages for Thomson's willful infringement. Id.
84 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1585 (2009). The district court also increased the damages to over $76 million plus interest
and issued a permanent injunction. Id.
85 Id. at 1328.
86 Id. at 1328-29.
87 Id. at 1323. See discussion infra Part II.A.
88 Id. at 1329 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir.
2007)).
89 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citing BMC Res., 498
F.3d at 1371), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 1330 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379).
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parties such that it could be said that Thomson performed every step of the asserted
claims. 92 The court found the fact that Thomson controlled access to its system and
instructed bidders on its use was insufficient to incur liability for direct infringe-
ment. 93 Thus, Thomson did not perform every step of the method claims, nor did it
have another party perform the steps on its behalf.94 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that Thomson did not infringe the asserted claims. 95
C. Summary
In sum, the decisions in BMC Resources and Muniauction articulated a stan-
dard for finding joint infringement of a single method by multiple parties. BMC
Resources held that in situations where steps of a method claim are performed by
multiple parties, the entire method must be performed at the control or direction of
the alleged direct infringer.96 The Muniauction decision reinforced that "the con-
trol or direction standard is satisfied in situations where the law would traditionally
hold the accused direct infringer vicariously liable for the acts committed by an-
other party that are required to complete performance of a claimed method."
' 97
Two years later, district courts have faced several challenges in applying the
framework set forth in BMC Resources and Muniauction.. For example, even after
Muniauction, one court remarked that the "Federal Circuit did not explain with any
specificity what it meant by 'direction or control.'
' 98
III. Guideposts along the multi-party spectrum: How courts have applied
BMC Resources and Muniauction
The primary challenge courts have encountered is evaluating the relationships
between alleged joint infringers. The Muniauction court explained the existence of
92 See id. at 1329-30.
9' See id. at 1330.
94 Id. at 1330.
95 Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.
Ct. 1585 (2009).
96 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
97 Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379).
98 Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1334 (S.D. Fla.
2008), affd, 318 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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a spectrum of multiparty relationships. 99 However, placing parties in the spectrum,
by looking at their relationship with each other, proved to be challenging.
In addition, the technology involved in subsequent joint infringement cases
ranged from wireless applications to distributed software systems. 00 Thus, courts
have had to apply the holdings of BMC Resources and Muniauction to various fac-
tual scenarios involving both method and apparatus claims.'01 Guidance can be ob-
tained, however, by examining district courts' analysis as to where certain fact pat-
terns lie along the multiparty spectrum between arms-length negotiation and
vicarious liability.
A. Evidence of Mere Guidance or Instruction is Insufficient Evidence of
Direction or Control
The results in BMC Resources and Muniauction indicate that providing data
to another party or controlling access to a system and providing instructions for us-
ing that system do not support an inference adequate to show direction or con-
trol. 102 In Global Patent Holdings, after summarizing BMC Resources and Muni-
auction, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida concluded that
the Federal Circuit did not intend for evidence of "mere guidance or instruction in
how to conduct some of the steps of a method patent" to satisfy the direction or
control standard. 0 3 Instead, the district court reiterated that a finding of joint in-
fringement is warranted under this standard if a third party performs "the steps of
the patented process by virtue of a contractual obligation or other relationship that
gives rise to vicarious liability.
'104
99 Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1380-
81 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 829 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
See also discussion infra Part lI.B.
100 See, e.g., Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 n.1 (involving a method patent for
downloading data from a remote server); Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp.
2d 224, 236-37 (D. Del. 2009) (involving patents for video-on-demand programming).
101 See, e.g., Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. 111. 2008) (involving an appa-
ratus claim); Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1332 n.1 (involving a method claim).
102 See supra notes 71, 93 and accompanying text; see also Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (citing
BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)); Muniauction, 532
F.3d at 1329.
103 Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
104 Id.
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The patent at issue concerned a method for downloading data from a remote
server.105 The plaintiff, Global Patent Holdings (Global), alleged that the defen-
dant, Panthers BRHC (Panthers), infringed Global's patent through the joint action
of Panthers and home users of Panthers' website (i.e., the Boca Resort website).' 06
The Boca Resort website supplied computer programs that were executed on the
users' computers.'0 7 Global asserted that the website controlled and directed the
operation of the programs on the users' computers. 08 Specifically, Global argued
that the asserted claim's method step of "identifying a query via a data input means
and inputting said query to remote query and data retrieval means" was controlled
by the defendant's website even though it was executed on a user's computer. 
09
Panthers responded that under the standard set forth in BMC Resources, Global had
not alleged that Panthers exercised sufficient direction or control of the third party
infringers. " 0
After briefly examining the holdings in BMC Resources and Muniauction, the
district court explained that a finding of joint infringement under BMC Resources is
unwarranted absent evidence that the third party is required to perform steps of the
patented process through a contractual obligation or some other relationship estab-
lishing vicarious liability."' With this understanding, the court noted that there
were no facts presented that a remote user was contractually obligated to visit the
defendant's website or that the remote users were Global's agents and visited the
website in the scope of their agency. 112 Observing that the claimed method did not
begin until a remote user visited the defendant's website and absent a showing that
the users were somehow required to visit the website, the district court found that
15 Id. at 1332 n.1.
106 Id. at 1333.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1332 n.1, 1333
(S.D. Fla. 2008), affd, 318 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009). More specifically, "plaintiff allege[d]
that step (a) of claim 17 of the '341 patent is controlled by Defendant, even though it is executed
by a remote user's computer, because the remote user's computer 'runs Javascript programs and
renders html-based web page material which have been supplied to the user's computer by Boca
Resort's website."' Id.
l"O Id. at 1333.
1 Id. at 1335.
112 id.
[VOL. 18:335
Ramifications of Joint Infringement Theory
the defendant's conduct was not sufficient to establish direction or control." 3 The
district court also concluded that the defendant did not exercise sufficient control
by putting software on user computers to allow users to begin the process. 11
4
Thus, the Global Patent Holdings court made clear that evidence that a de-
fendant provided guidance or instruction to a third party is probably not sufficient
to support a claim of joint infringement. 1 5 One court has applied Global Patent
Holdings by finding that "[g]iving instructions or prompts to the third party in its
performance of the steps necessary to complete infringement, or facilitating or ar-
ranging for the third-party's involvement in the alleged infringement, are not suffi-
cient" evidence of direction or control. 116
Another important aspect of Global Patent Holdings is the court's indication
that evidence of a contractual obligation between a defendant and third party could
lead to a finding of joint infringement. " 7 The court did not elaborate on the type of
contractual obligation that would be sufficient. 118 However, another recent district
court decision has specifically examined whether a contractual obligation was suf-
ficient to support a finding of joint infringement." 9
B. Evidence of a Contract Between Two Parties, by Itself, is Insufficient
for a Finding of Direction or Control
BMC Resources suggested that the existence of a contractual relationship be-
tween the accused infringer and the third party performing other steps of a patented
method was a significant consideration in determining whether the accused in-
fringer exercised direction or control. 120  The decision in Akamai Techs, Inc. v.
113 Id.
114 Id.
"15 Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla.
2008) (emphasizing that merely putting Javascript applications on the user's computer for the
process to begin is insufficient to meet the BMC Resources standard, absent additional showing of
some form of relationship that establishes vicarious liability between the defendant and the third
party), aff'd, 318 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
116 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
117 Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
118 Id.
119 See Akamai Techs, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 118 (D. Mass. 2009).
120 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2007). See also Akamai
Techs, 614 F. Supp. 2d at. at 117-18; supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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Limelight Networks, Inc., elaborated on this issue by examining whether a contract
between a customer and content provider was sufficient to support a finding of joint
infringement. 1
21
In Akamai, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts first ad-
dressed whether a finding of vicarious liability was necessary to fulfill BMC Re-
sources' control or direction standard. 122 The court found that if evidence of vi-
carious liability were required for a finding of joint infringement, then an entity
could escape liability just by hiring an independent contractor to execute one or
more steps of a patented method.123 Acknowledging that BMC Resources stated
that one could not avoid liability simply by contracting out steps of a claimed proc-
ess to another party, the court concluded that lack of evidence of vicarious liability
would not preclude joint infringement. 24 Although a finding of vicarious liability
is not necessary, the court explained that Muniauction required more than evidence
of a mere "contractual agreement to pay for a defendant's services and instructions
or directions on how to use those services" to satisfy the direction or control stan-
dard. 12
5
Turning to Akamai's facts, the court observed that the defendant, Limelight
Networks, Inc. (Limelight), had an agreement with its customers to provide a ser-
vice (page objects from its network) in exchange for financial consideration. 26
However, the customer had to perform a step of the asserted method claim in order
to obtain the services Limelight offered. 127 The court further noted that the cus-
tomer's performance of this step is not a contractual obligation and may be per-
formed whether they subscribed to Limelight's services or not. 128 Accordingly, the
court found that the elements of direct infringement were not met since the type of
121 See Akamai Techs, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 116-23.
122 See id. at 119-20.
123 Id. at 120 (citing Graham v. Malone Freight Lines, Inc., 314 F.3d 7, 15 (1st Cir. 1999) ("Employ-
ers are generally not liable for the negligent acts of the independent contractors they hire.")).
124 Id. (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381).
125 Id. at 121.
126 Id.
127 Akamai Techs, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 121 (D. Mass. 2009) (com-
paring the facts with the defendant in Muniaction and concluding that in both cases "the customer
must perform a step of the patented method in order to obtain the offered service").
128 Id. at 122.
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contract for services between Akamai and its customers did not establish direction
or control. 
129
In Gammino v. Cellco Partnership, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania reached a similar result. 130 There was evidence of a con-
tract between the defendants and service providers. 131 However, evidence of a con-
tract by itself was not enough for the court to find that the defendants directed or
controlled the actions of the service providers. 1
32
In addition to the findings in Akamai and Gammino, one commentator has
noted that it is unlikely that courts will find evidence of direction or control be-
tween a company and its customers in most circumstances. 33 Thus, under BMC
Resources, a "contract for services [alone probably] does not give rise to direction
or control, even if the customer must perform one or more steps of the patented
process in order to receive the benefits of those services."' 134 Instead, even where a
contract exists, courts have indicated that evidence that the accused party (i.e., the
mastermind) directed or controlled how a third party performed the steps of a
method claim is required. 135
C. Evidence of "Continuing Control" May be Sufficient to Support an
Infringement Claim
The control or direction standard may be satisfied in cases where there exists
a "contractual agency relationship between the 'mastermind' and the third party
129 See id.
130 Gammino v. Cellco P'ship, 527 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2007). In the Gammino case, however,
the defendant was the purchaser of the service (international call blocking), which the plaintiff
claimed infringed its patent. Id. at 397.
131 Id. The defendant purchased telephone service along with international call blocking from various
local providers. Id.
132 Id. at 398-99.
133 See Larsen, supra note 18, at 58-59 ("If liability should be imposed upon entities who seek to reap
the commercial benefit of another's patented process and avoid liability simply by exploiting the
technicalities of infringement jurisprudence, an approach broader than the 'control or direction'
standard of BMC v. Paymentech is needed.").
134 See Akamai Techs, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 121 (D. Mass. 2009).
135 See, e.g., Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 833 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Gammino,
527 F. Supp. 2d 395; Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d 90;
2010]
TEXAS INTELLECTUAL PROPERTYLAWJOURNAL
performing some of the steps necessary to show infringement."1 36 In a recent deci-
sion, the court in American Patent Development found that evidence of software
running on a third-party system being continuously controlled by an accused in-
fringer may be sufficient to support a claim for infringement under a joint in-
fringement theory. 1
37
American Patent Development Corporation (APDC) asserted that Movielink
infringed claims I and 2 of U.S. Patent No. 5,400,402 ('402 patent). 138 The '402
patent pertained to systems for controlling the use of video-on-demand program-
ming.139 Specifically, it "relates to a system for limiting the use of a downloaded
video program purchased by a customer [where] a 'central station' transmits a
'video product' to a customer at a 'user site."''140 The claims at issue were directed
to methods that would restrict the customer's access to video programming once
particular viewing limits were reached.'14 Claim 1 of the '402 patent reads:
1. A method for providing a video product from a central station to a user site,
comprising the steps of:
transmitting from said central station to said user site a digital data stream com-
prising said video product, and data establishing a limit for authorized viewing of
said video product;
storing said video product at said user site;
decoding said data establishing a limit for authorized viewing of said video prod-
uct;
storing a result of said decoding step;
blocking access to said video product stored at said user site if said limit for au-
thorized viewing is exceeded. 142
APDC alleged that the Movielink Manager software performed the steps of "decod-
ing," "storing" and "blocking access" recited in the asserted claims.143 APDC ex-
136 Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
137 See Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236-37 (D. Del. 2009).
138 Id. at 227.
139 Id. at 226. See also U.S. Patent No. 5,400,402 (filed June 7, 1993).
140 Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 227 (D. Del. 2009).
141 Id.
142 U.S. Patent No. 5,400,402 (filed June 7, 1993).
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plained that to use Movielink's service, a customer must have the Movielink Man-
ager software installed on her computer. 144 The customer then uses the software to
download a requested video from servers controlled by Movielink.145 The software
then works with Microsoft Digital Rights Management application to determine
whether the user has permission to view the downloaded video. 146 If it determines
that the user did not have permission then the video product is deleted and the
memory, where the video was previously stored, is wiped. 147
The court articulated that the central issue was whether "the Movielink Man-
ager software running on customers' computers can be, as APDC contends, consid-
ered part of a 'unitary' Movielink system that is controlled or directed by a
Movielink 'mastermind."",148  APDC pointed to evidence that Movielink retained
control over the Movielink Manager software that ran on user computers. 149 For
instance, Movielink's documentation indicated that the Movielink Manager soft-
ware was integrated with its server software referred to as the Web Commerce Ap-
plication. ' 5 0 Further, APDC noted that Movielink, through its software, had the ca-
pacity to revoke customer licenses. 151
Movielink, relying on the decision in Global Patent Holdings, argued that it is
not liable under a joint infringement theory because it did not perform all the steps
recited in claim 1.152 Specifically, Movielink asserted that some steps of claim 1
143 Am. Patent Dev., 637 F. Supp. 2d at 236.
'44 Id. at 227.
141 Id. at 228.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 236.
149 Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236-37 (D. Del. 2009) (noting
that APDC has pointed to sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment).
o Id. at 237 ("[T]he Movielink Manager software is repeatedly depicted in Movielink documents as
being part of an integrated Movielink system made up of a number of highly interrelated compo-
nents.").
151 See id. (finding the testimony of Movielink's former Vice President of Web Engineering and Op-
eration compelling).
112 Id. at 235-36.
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were performed by a user on the user's computer. 5 3 Movielink added that it did
not control the user computer or the software running on the user's computer. 1
54
The court distinguished these facts from those in Global Patent Holdings,
where the first step of a claim being asserted required the specific action of a re-
mote computer user. 155  Examining the claims at issue, the court observed that
unlike the asserted claims in Global Patent Holdings, none of the steps in claim I
must be performed by a "remote computer user." 56 Instead, the court characterized
the asserted claim 1 as merely requiring the operation of components at a "central
station" and a "user site." 1
57
Further, the court found that the evidence presented by APDC that Movielink
maintained control over the Movielink Manager software was sufficient to survive
summary judgment. 158 Although part of the Movielink software ran on a customer
computer, the court concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Movielink exercised continuing control over the software.159 Similarly, as
discussed below, courts have found that a fact issue exists concerning joint in-
fringement when presented with evidence that the alleged infringer exercised spe-
cific control over the actions of third parties.
D. Evidence that an Alleged Infringer Caused Third Parties to Perform in
Accordance with Specific Instructions and Requirements May Be
Sufficient to Support a Joint Infringement Claim
In Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas concluded, after a lengthy analysis of other district court decisions
analyzing BMC Resources and Muniauction, that "to raise a fact issue as to direct
153 Id. at 235.
154 Id.
155 Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236 (D. Del. 2009) (citing Global
Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
("Plaintiff conceded that the patented method does not begin until a computer user visits Defen-
dant's website. If no person ever visited Defendant's website, then Plaintiff's patent would never





'9 Id. at 237.
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infringement under the direction-or-control standard, the alleged infringer must
cause third parties to perform steps of the claimed method in accordance with spe-
cific instructions and requirements." ' 160 In reaching this conclusion, the district
court relied in part on the facts presented in Rowe International Corp. v. Ecast,
Inc. 161
In Rowe, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that
there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that third-party de-
fendants were under the direction and control of Ecast, Inc. in the manufacturing of
jukebox hardware. 162 The plaintiffs, Rowe International Corp. and Arachnid, Inc.,
claimed that Ecast, Rock-Ola Manufacturing Corp., and View Interactive Enter-
tainment Corp. infringed six patents owned by Arachnid and licensed to Rowe.
163
Each of the asserted patents was directed to computer jukeboxes and computer
jukebox networks. 164 Unlike BMC Resources and Muniauction, the claims at issue
in Rowe involved apparatus claims. 165 For example, among other claims Rowe as-
serted, claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,397,189 is a patent for an improved computer
jukebox comprising a communication interface, a data storage unit, a display, selec-
tion keys, and several other component parts. 166
The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment on the infringement claims. 167
In response, defendants argued that none of them directly infringed the patents. 168
Specifically, the defendants asserted that because Rock-Ola and View Interactive
made only the jukebox components and Ecast provided only the memory compo-
nent and the network, while the operators of the jukeboxes put the system together,
160 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 834 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
161 Id. See also Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. Il. 2008).
162 Rowe, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 933; Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
163 Rowe, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
'64 Id. at 930.
165 Id. at 930; BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (involving
method patents); Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (in-
volving method patents), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009). See also supra notes 30-41 and
accompanying text.
166 U.S. Patent No. 6,397,189 (filed May 12, 1998); Rowe, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
167 Rowe, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 929.
168 Id. at 930.
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none of them alone directly infringed the asserted claims. 169 In Ecast's view, Ecast,
Rock-Ola and View Interactive were partners. 
170
The district court, however, found that "[d]efendants [were] not entitled to
denial of plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on the ground that no one of them
directly infringe[d] the asserted patents."'' 71 In reaching this conclusion, the court
pointed to several indications of direction and control that Ecast exercised over
Rock-Ola and View Interactive. 172 For instance, the court found that Rock-Ola and
View Interactive had manufacturing and distribution contracts with Ecast. 7 3 Pur-
suant to these contracts, Rock-Ola and View Interactive specifically manufactured
jukeboxes made for the Ecast network service. 174 Ecast's own promotional materi-
als reflected a system that included a wide area network consisting of consumer en-
tertainment jukebox units (supplied by Rock-Ola and View Interactive) and a data
center (operated by Ecast).175
Moreover, Ecast provided Rock-Ola and View Interactive with designs re-
lated to the jukebox that would make Ecast's software network more successful. 17 6
In one example of this reference designs, Ecast informed Rock-Ola and View Inter-
active that its software was written to communicate with a specific type of hard-
ware device (an Elo Intellitouch Serial Controller) and that Ecast would need to ap-
prove any changes from this specification.177
The court also observed that there was no suggestion that Rock-Ola or View
Interactive independently manufactured jukeboxes for the Ecast system. 178 Further,
the court noted that View Interactive was required to obtain permission to manufac-
169 Id. at 930-31.
170 Id. at 933.
171 Id. at931.
172 Id. at 932-33.
173 Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. Il. 2008).
174 Id. The court also noted that Rock-Ola and View Interactive were not independently producing
jukeboxes that would work with Ecast. Id.
175 Id. at 931.
176 Id. at 933.
177 id.
178 Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. 111. 2008).
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ture jukeboxes for the Ecast network pursuant to its contract. 179 In sum, the court
concluded that Ecast contracted out to Rock-Ola and View Interactive the manufac-
ture of the jukebox hardware, an element in the asserted apparatus claims.180 Ac-
cordingly, because the court found that there was evidence that Ecast caused Rock-
Ola and View Interactive to manufacture a computer jukebox in accordance with
specific instructions and requirements, Ecast's denial of plaintiffs summary judg-
ment for lack of direct infringement failed. 8'
Similarly, in TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., the U.S. District Court for the East-
ern District of Texas held that there was sufficient evidence that the accused in-
fringer controlled or directed the work of third parties to preclude judgment as a
matter of law.' 82 In that case, TGIP, Inc. claimed that AT&T infringed two patents
related to prepaid calling cards. 183 AT&T renewed motions for judgment as a mat-
ter of law based on several grounds after the jury found for TGIP. 184 Among others,
AT&T asserted that the record could not sustain TGIP's claim for infringement un-
der a joint infringement theory. 185
The first patent at issue, U.S. Patent No. 5,511,114 ('114 Patent), related to a
"prepaid calling card system having a remote terminal to provide on-site activation
and re-charging of calling cards."186 The four components of the system included a
plurality of calling cards, a host computer, a plurality of on-site activation termi-
nals, and a call processor. 18 7 The "data terminals were remote from the host com-
puter ... [while the] call processor was controlled by the host computer for con-
necting one or more customers to the telephone network using the authorized
calling cards."' 188 The second patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,721,768 ('768 Patent), was




182 TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 578 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
183 Id. at 567.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id. at 568. See also U.S. Patent No. 5,511,114 (filed June 6, 1994).
187 TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
188 Id.
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prepaid card account at a user activation terminal. 189  "The activation terminals
[were] connected to a main processor, which include[d] a host computer responsi-
ble for management and processing of the system through a purchasing net-
work." 190
Claim 1 of the '114 patent is representative of the asserted claims:
1. A pre-paid calling card system to enable customers to purchase calling cards
at predetermined locations and to use such calling cards to access a telephone
network having at least one telephone, comprising:
a plurality of calling cards, each of said calling cards having a security number
associated therewith that must be entered at a telephone to obtain access to the
telephone network;
a host computer including at least one input port and a database for storing secu-
rity numbers;
at least one data terminal located at a predetermined location remote from the
host computer and connectable to the input port for associating, at the host com-
puter, an amount of call authorization to a security number of a ceiling card using
data transmitted between the data terminal and the host computer during one or
more charging transactions, the means for associating of the data terminal includ-
ing:
means for entering the security number;
means, operative during any initial transaction and any recharge transaction, for
entering any monetary amount corresponding to the amount of call authorization;
means for connecting to the host computer to transfer the security number and
the call authorization amount; and
means responsive to the transfer for receiving a verification message from the
host computer authorizing receipt of the monetary amount to thereby associate at
the host computer the call authorization amount to the security number, wherein
the calling card does not store the call authorization amount; and
wherein the database includes a record for each calling card security number hav-
ing a call authorization amount associated therewith, the record including a bal-
ance; and
a call processor running on the host computer and responsive to entry of the secu-
rity number for enabling the customer to access the telephone network using the
telephone, the call processor using the balance in the record associated with the
189 Id. at 568-69; U.S. Patent No. 5,721,768 (filed Nov. 18, 1996).
190 TGIP, 527 F. Supp. 2d at 569.
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security number for monitoring call progress and terminating the customer's ac-
cess to the telephone network when the balance is exhausted.
19 1
TGIP's witnesses stated that AT&T's system operated with three components: call-
ing cards, data terminals, and a host computer. 192  The calling card is swiped
through a magnetic card reader or data terminal. 193 The data terminal receives in-
formation from the card and sends a request to the host computer. 194 Upon receipt
of the request, the host computer checks to see "whether the card control number is
allowable, whether the card has not expired, and whether the card is eligible for ac-
tivation."'1 95
AT&T contended that third-party systems that were not under its direction or
control performed essential steps necessary for joint infringement. 196 It pointed to
activation platforms provided by West Interactive and A.P.T. and data terminals
provided by retailers. 197 AT&T moved for judgment as a matter of law on the
ground that there was no evidence of infringement. 198 Applying BMC Resources,
the court denied the motion. 199 Specifically, the court pointed to testimony by
AT&T's corporate representative that West Interactive acted on its behalf.200 Fur-
ther, there was evidence that AT&T provided specifications to retailers for sending
activation messages in a certain format defined by requirements in AT&T's techni-
cal plan. 20 ' Accordingly, the district court found sufficient evidence that AT&T
controlled or directed the work of third parties, which supported its denial of
AT&T's motion for judgment as a matter of law.20 2
191 U.S. Patent No. 5,511,114 (filed June 6, 1994).




196 Id. at 577.
"' Id. at 577.
198 TGIP, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 527 F. Supp. 2d 561, 567 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
199 Id. at 577-78 (discussing the Federal Circuit's decision in BMC Resources and applying it to the
facts of the case).
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E. Summary
Based on the cases decided since BMC Resources and Muniauction, parties
asserting infringement under a theory of joint infringement will not succeed by re-
lying solely on evidence indicating that multiple alleged infringers took part in
some form of arms-length cooperation.203 At least one court has found that evi-
dence of mere guidance or instruction by an accused infringer is not sufficient for a
finding of direction or control under BMC Resources.204 Further, evidence of a
contract between two parties (a company and its customer) is, by itself, not suffi-
cient for a finding of direction or control.20 5
A finding of vicarious liability lies on the opposite side of the multiparty
spectrum. 20 6 However, courts have observed that lack of evidence of vicarious li-
ability does not end the inquiry whether there may be joint infringement. 20 7 For
example, evidence that an alleged infringer exercised continuing control in a dis-
tributed system may be sufficient to support a claim for infringement based on a
joint infringement theory.20 8 Further, evidence that an alleged infringer caused
third parties to perform in accordance with specific instructions and requirements
may be sufficient to support a claim under a joint infringement theory.20 9
Identifying successful joint infringement fact patterns can be useful. How-
ever, courts have identified claim-drafting issues that, if remedied, would have pre-
vented a patentee from relying solely on a joint infringement theory.21 0 Thus, while
the claim-drafting principles endorsed in BMC Resources may be well known, it is
203 See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
204 See, e.g., Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1335 (S.D.
Fla. 2008), aff'd, 318 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
205 See Akamai Techs, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 121 (D. Mass. 2009).
206 See Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1330.
207 See Akamai, 614 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
208 See Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 236-37 (D. Del. 2009).
209 See Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 828 (S.D. Tex. 2008); Rowe Int'l Corp, v.
Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. Il. 2008).
210 See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("A patentee can
usually structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party." (citing Mark A. Lemley et al.,
Divided Infringement Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 225, 272-75 (2005))).
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important to examine how courts have interpreted claim language in a joint in-
fringement context in order to determine the proper way to structure a claim.
21
IV. The Impact of Joint Infringement Theory on Claim Drafting
In BMC Resources, the Federal Circuit stated that "concerns over a party
avoiding infringement by arms-length cooperation can usually be offset by proper
claim drafting., 212 The Federal Circuit also said that it "will not unilaterally re-
structure claim[s] or the standards for joint infringement to remedy ill-conceived
claims."' t 3 Accordingly, it is imperative that a patent holder draft and assert well-
crafted claims sufficient to support a finding of infringement against a single party.
Patent holders have struggled with proving infringement of a method claim
having multiple parties that perform different acts.214 However, a patent holder can
avoid having to rely solely on a joint infringement theory by carefully drafting and
asserting claims "to capture infringement by a single party. '215 The Federal Circuit
has observed that this can be done in most cases simply by asserting claims that
feature "references to a single party's supplying or receiving each element of the
claimed process."21 6
A. Claims Requiring a User to Interact with Another Entity Have Been
Problematic for Patent Holders
In cases where joint infringement is asserted, claims that require the action of
third parties triggers a detailed inquiry into the relationship between the accused in-
fringer and the third party. 217 For example, in Global Patent Holdings, Global con-
ceded that the initial step of the asserted patent claim called for action by a remote
211 See id. (noting the flaw in BMC's claim drafting by "hav[ing] four different parties perform dif-
ferent acts within one claim").
212 Id.
213 Id.
214 See, e.g., BMC Res., 498 F.3d 1373; Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318 (Fed.
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1585 (2009).
215 BMCRes., 498 F.3d at 1381.
216 See id.
217 See, e.g., Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 8i i (S.D. Tex. 2008); Rowe Int'i Corp,
v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 933 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F.
Supp. 2d 924 (N.D. Ill. 2008); Global Patent Holdings, LLC v. Panthers BRHC LLC, 586 F.
Supp. 2d 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2008), affd, 318 F. App'x 908 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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21computer user. 18 A website server was also required to complete the claimed
method. 219 The court assessed the relationship between the remote computer user
and the website server to determine whether the defendant's website exercised di-
rection or control over the remote computer user.
220
Global did not allege that the remote computer users were contractually
bound to visit the defendant's website. 221 Nor did Global allege that the remote
computer users were the defendant's agents visiting the website within the scope of
their agency.222 Thus, the court concluded that the remote computer users were not
under the direction or control of the defendant's website.2 23 Accordingly, the re-
224mote computer users and the defendant's website were not joint infringers.
Similarly, the asserted method claims in Emtel required a physician to diag-
nose a medical condition or aid in treating a medical condition. 225 Emtel's method
claims were directed to providing medical care to patients in remote locations
through the use of videoconferencing equipment.226 The medical activities of a
physician made up only a few steps in the method claims.227 Claim 1 of the as-
serted U.S. Patent No. 7,129,970 reads:
1. A business method for delivery of medical services utilizing a system includ-
ing a plurality of satellite medical care facilities, at least one physician disposed
at a central medical video-conferencing station, and a first patient and a first
218 Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335. The first step of claim I of U.S. Patent No.
5,253,341 is "identifying a query via a data input means and inputting said query to remote query
and data retrieval means." Id. at 1332 n.1; See also U.S. Patent No. 5,253,341 (filed Apr. 11,
1991).
219 Global Patent Holdings, 586 F. Supp. 2d at 1335.
220 Id. (noting the plaintiffs allegation that the defendant controlled the remote user by putting





225 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 815-17 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (discussing asserted
claims 1 and 4).
226 Id. at 825.
227 See id.
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medical care giver disposed in a first of said plurality of satellite medical care fa-
cilities, the method comprising the steps of:
(a) establishing a video-conferencing communications system among said medi-
cal video-conferencing station and said plurality of satellite medical care facili-
ties;
(b) selecting said first of said plurality of satellite medical care facilities to ac-
tively receive video and audio communication from said physician;
(c) controlling a video-conferencing system of said first of said plurality of satel-
lite medical care facilities to control a video image received at said central medi-
cal video-conferencing station from said first of said plurality of satellite medical
care facilities;
(d) diagnosing a medical condition of said first patient at said first of said plural-
ity of satellite medical care facilities by said physician from said central medical
video-conferencing station;
(e) providing instructions via said video-conferencing system to said first medical
caregiver by said physician to treat said first patient at said first of said plurality
of satellite medical facilities;
(f) selecting a second of said plurality of satellite medical care facilities to ac-
tively receive video and audio communication from said physician;
(g) displaying an image of a second patient disposed at said second of said plural-
ity of satellite emergency care facilities at said central medical video-
conferencing station;
(h) controlling a video-conferencing system of said second of said plurality of
satellite medical care facilities to control said image received at said central
medical video-conferencing station from said second of said plurality of satellite
medical care facilities;
(i) diagnosing a medical condition of said second patient by said physician from
said central medical videoconferencing station; and
(j) providing instructions via said video-conferencing system to a second medical
caregiver disposed at said second of said plurality of satellite medical care facili-
ties by said physician to treat said second patient generally contemporaneously
with said steps of diagnosing said medical condition of said first patient and pro-
viding instructions to said first medical caregiver.
228
The defendants provided "telemedicine support services. '' 229 Specifically, they en-
tered into contracts with physicians or physician groups and remote medical care
228 Id. at 815-16. See also U.S. Patent No. 7,129,970 (filed Mar. 25, 2003).
229 Emtel, 583 F. Supp. 2d at 817.
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facilities to provide outsourced videoconferencing services.23 ° Under these con-
tracts, the physicians agreed to work as independent contractors to provide diagnos-
tic and treatment services. 231 The defendant's videoconferencing equipment pro-
vided the remote medical care facilities access to the physicians.232 This allowed
the physicians to respond to requests from the remote medical care facilities.233
The court analyzed whether, under these contracts, the defendants exercised
control or direction over the physicians in performing the required medical steps of
the claimed method.234 In examining this issue, the court focused on whether the
defendants would be vicariously liable for the physician's actions.235 The court ex-
plained that "a contracting party is not vicariously liable for the actions of an inde-
pendent contractor unless that party controls the details of the independent contrac-
tor's work to such an extent that the contractor cannot perform the work as he
chooses. 236
While acknowledging that the relationship between the accused infringer and
physicians was stronger than the relationships at issue in BMC Resources and Mu-
niauction, the court did not find vicarious liability.237 Instead, the court character-
ized their contractual relationship as "set[ting] some basic parameters for the physi-
cians. 238 The defendants were not involved in how the physicians performed the
required diagnoses and treatment, which were required steps of the claimed





234 See id. at 835 ("The parties [disputed] whether these contracts establish direction or control by the
movants over the physicians' performance of the steps of the claimed method of using videocon-
ferencing in diagnosing remote patients, instructing on treating remote patients, and aiding in
treating remote patients.").
235 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 835 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
236 Id. at 837 (citing Indian Harbor Ins. Co. v. Valley Forge Ins. Group, 535 F.3d 359, 364-65 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
237 Id. at 837-38.
238 Id. at 838.
239 Id.
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to establish that the defendants directed or controlled the physicians in their per-
formance of the claimed method steps.240
In its opinion, the court explained how the asserted claims could have been
rewritten to capture infringement of a single party. 241 The claims could have been
rewritten to focus on the videoconferencing system provider "'supplying or receiv-
ing each element of the claimed process' rather than referring to different parties
performing different acts within one claim." 242 The court stated that such changes
would have avoided divided infringement while preserving the method being
claimed.243 While patent holders are encouraged to focus their claims on a single
party, one decision, discussed below, has indicated that focus on a single entity is
not compromised by referring to third parties in the claims.
B. Claims that Assume the Existence of Third Parties May Capture
Infringement by a Single Actor
Claims that assume the existence of external elements have been found to
capture infringement by a single party.244 In Level 3 Communications, LLC v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
found that an asserted claim was written to capture single-party infringement.
245
Claim 8 of U.S. Patent No. 6,654,807 recited:
8. A method, in a system which includes (a) a repeater server network including
a plurality of repeater servers, (b) a plurality of subscribers to the repeater server
network, the plurality of subscribers being entities that publish information via
one or more origin servers, and in which the origin servers are distinct from the
plurality of repeater servers, and in which at least some of the plurality of re-
240 Id. at 839-40. The court also emphasized that there was insufficient evidence that the physicians
directed or controlled the defendants. Id. at 840.
241 Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811, 840 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
242 Id. Specifically, the plaintiff's claims "could be rewritten to refer to the telemedicine videocon-
ferencing system provider receiving in a central medical videoconferencing station a physician's
diagnosis of a medical condition of a patient in a satellite medical care facility, transmitting that
diagnosis to the satellite medical care facility, receiving instructions provided by the physician to
treat a patient at the satellite facility; and transmitting those instructions to the satellite medical fa-
cility." Id.
243 id.
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peater servers replicate some or all of the information available on at least some
of the origin servers, (c) a repeater selector mechanism constructed and adapted
to identify, for a particular client request, an appropriate repeater server from the
plurality of repeater servers, and (d) a subscriber verifying mechanism con-
structed and adapted to verify whether an entity is any one of the plurality of sub-
scribers to the repeater server network, method comprising:
obtaining a client request for information by a repeater server of the plurality of
repeater servers forming the repeater server network, the repeater server being
identified by the repeater selector mechanism, wherein the client request is for a
resource which is embedded in another document; determining, using at least the
subscriber verifying mechanism and based, at least in part, on a name by which
the repeater server was addressed, whether the requested information is from any
one of the plurality of entities that publish information to the repeater server net-
work; and when the client request is determined to be for information from one
of the plurality of entities that publish information to the repeater server network,
serving the requested information from the repeater sewer as identified by the re-
peater selector mechanism.
246
Although the preamble of claim 8 "assumes the existence of external elements such
as origin servers, clients, client requests, and subscriber content," the court noted
that the steps of the method claim did not appear to involve actions by multiple par-
ties. 247 The court reached this conclusion by emphasizing that these elements did
not play any role in any particular steps in any of the methods. 248 Accordingly, the
court found that infringement of the claim entailed the steps of a single party.24 9
C. Claim Amendments May Shift Focus from a Single Actor
In FotoMedia Technologies, LLC v. AOL, LLC, the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Texas evaluated whether a claim amendment changed a claim
that required a step to be perfdrmed by a server to a claim that required a user to
perform the step. 250 During patent prosecution, the asserted claim was amended to
246 U.S. Patent No. 6,654,807 (filed Dec. 6, 2001).
247 Level 3 Commc 'ns, 630 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
248 Id. at 659-60. For instance, in responding to the defendant's argument that it did not direct or
control its subscribers, the court emphasized that the subscribers were only passive elements of the
claims' methods. Id. at 660. It also pointed to the plaintiffs argument that it would be able to
prove infringement without referencing actions by the subscribers. Id.
249 Id. at 659.
250 FotoMedia Techs., LLC v. AOL, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-255, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62542 at *25-
28 (E.D. Tex. July 29, 2009).
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distinguish it from a reference cited by the examiner.251 The limitation "receiving
image data" was amended to read:
[R]eceiving image data embodying an electronic image, the image data trans-
ferred under control of the user at the sending computer, the image data residing
in the sending computer or an image source separate from and in communication
with the sending computer. 252
The examiner's explanation in the Notice of Allowability stated that "'[n]one of
the prior art of record [taught] the image data residing in the sending and trans-
ferred under control of the user at the sending computer.' ' 253 Accordingly, the de-
fendants argued that the amended "receiving" limitation must be read as requiring
that a user issue a command to send the image data.254 FotoMedia responded that
the claims were not amended to require a transfer step performed by a user.255
Citing BMC Resources, the court acknowledged that claim drafting allows a
patentee to structure a claim to capture infringement by a single party or multiple
25parties. 56 The court initially observed that the amended claim was drafted from
the server's perspective, not the sender's. 257 Therefore, it construed the claim limi-
tation "receiving image data" as "receiving by the server, image data., 258 Accord-
ingly, the court agreed with the plaintiff that the amendment did not require a user
to perform a step of the claimed method.259 While this finding was favorable to the
patentee, it illustrates the importance of proper claim drafting at the patent prosecu-
tion stage. Care must be taken when amending claims during prosecution to ensure
that claims originally structured to capture a single party are not amended to require
multiple parties.
251 Id. at *25-26.
252 Id. at *26; U.S. Patent No. 6,018,774 (filed July 3, 1991).
253 FotoMedia, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62542, at *26.
254 Id.
255 Id. at 27. FotoMedia argued that the amendment was only made to "identify the source of the im-
age." Id.
256 Id. at *27-28 (citing BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
257 Id. at *28.
258 ,I'tYfedia Tuchs., LLC v. AOL, LLC, No. 2:0/-CV-255, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62542 at *28
(E.D. Tex. July 29, 2009).
259 See id.
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V. Conclusion
Advancements in technology are ushering in a new era where previously in-
compatible devices and components will interact with each other to form complex
systems.260 Innovators are racing to patent such technologies and enforce them in
the marketplace. However, patent holders must understand that direct infringement
requires a single party "to perform or use each and every step or element of a
claimed method or product.",261 Where an asserted claim requires multiple actors,
the theory of joint infringement provides an avenue for enforcement.262 However,
absent significant evidence concerning the relationship between multiple actors,
patent holders have found it difficult to support claims of infringement under a joint
infringement theory.
In brief, very specific evidence of the accused party exercising direction or
control over a third party must be present for a claim of joint infringement to sur-
vive summary judgment. Evidence of a contract between two parties (e.g., a com-
pany and its customer) is probably not sufficient.263 However, evidence that the al-
leged infringer exercised continuing control over third party components in a
distributed system may be sufficient. 264 In addition, evidence that an alleged in-
fringer caused third parties to perform steps of a claimed method in accordance
with specific instructions and requirements may also be sufficient. 265 Accordingly,
patentees should give careful thought to whether sufficient evidence exists prior to
asserting joint infringement.
A patentee can avoid relying solely on a claim of joint infringement by draft-
266ing and asserting claims directed toward a single entity. Claims in which a user
is required to interact with another system or component have been problematic for
patent holders.2 67 However, at least one court has observed that even claims that
260 See, e.g., Bogdanowicz, supra note 6, at 9 (discussing the future innovations attributed to DCC
technology).
261 BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
262 Id.
263 See Akamai Techs, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d 90, 122-23 (D. Mass. 2009).
264 See Am. Patent Dev. Corp. v. Movielink, LLC, 637 F. Supp. 2d 224, 233 (D. Del. 2009).
265 See Rowe Int'l Corp, v. Ecast, Inc. 586 F. Supp. 2d 924, 932-33 (N.D. I11. 2008).
266 See BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381.
267 See Emtel, Inc. v. LipidLabs, Inc., 583 F. Supp. 2d 811 (S.D. Tex. 2008).
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assume the existence of other entities may still cover just a single actor.268 Finally,
patentees must be cautious when amending claims during prosecution to keep the
focus of the claims on a single actor.269
268 See Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 630 F. Supp. 2d 654, 660 (E.D. Va.
2008).
269 See FotoMedia Techs., LLC v. AOL, LLC, No. 2:07-CV-255, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62542 at
*25-28 (E.D. Tex. July 29, 2009).
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